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Background: The scale and complexity of British gambling advertising has 
increased in recent years. “Live-odds” TV gambling adverts broadcast the odds 
on very specific, complex, gambles during sporting events (e.g., in soccer, 
“Wayne Rooney to score the first goal, 5-to-1,” or, “Chelsea to win 2-1, 10-to-
1”). These gambles were analyzed from a behavioral scientific perspective (the 
intersection of economics and psychology). Method: A mixed methods design 
combining observational and experimental data. A content analysis showed that 
live-odds adverts from two months of televised English Premier League matches 
were biased towards complex, rather than simple, gambles. Complex gambles 
were also associated with high bookmaker profit margins.  A series of 
experiments then quantified the rationality of participants’ forecasts across key 
gambles from the content analysis (Total N = 1,467 participants across 5 
Experiments). Results: Soccer fans rarely formed rational probability judgments 
for the complex events dominating gambling advertising, but were much better at 
estimating simple events. Conclusions: British gambling advertising is 
concentrated on the complex products that mislead consumers the most. 
Behavioral scientific findings are relevant to the active public debate about 
gambling. 
Keywords: sports betting; in-play gambling; television advertising; behavioral 
science; behavioral science of gambling; economics; psychology 
Introduction 
Gambling is an active British pastime of key economic importance, with the latest 
figures showing the public’s annual losses are running at £13.6 billion, or £310 ($439) 
per adult per year (Ellson, 2016). These gambling losses are supported by frequent 
advertising that stresses the gratification, possibilities, and excitement involved in 
gambling. The latest figures show that 4.1% of all TV advertising in 2012 was for 
gambling (Ofcom, 2013), and that the industry has spent £500 million on advertising 
since 2012 (Davies, 2016). Newsworthy figures such as these have stoked a heated 
debate about gambling’s role in British society (Bridge, 2016; Sylvester, 2014). This 
paper adds data to this debate by showing that previous behavioral science (the 
intersection of economics and psychology) findings conceptually replicate and have 
regulatory implications for “live-odds” TV gambling adverts. A relatively modern 
invention, live-odds adverts have become an unavoidable part of watching British 
sports. Live-odds adverts broadcast odds on specific gambles (e.g., “Wayne Rooney to 
score the first goal, 5/1”) during televised matches. The same advertising also occurs 
across a diverse range of media, for example betting shop windows, newspapers, online 
banner adverts and social media, and SMS text messaging. 
Research in a range of consumer markets, such as credit cards, mobile phone 
contracts, and subprime mortgages shows that highly-complex and often poor value-for-
money products are often sold to the least-informed consumers (Bar-Gill & Stone, 
2009; Bar-Gill, 2009; Bar-Gill, 2012; Ru & Schoar, 2016). Less-informed credit card 
customers are more likely to receive promotions highlighting salient near-term but small 
benefits, while savvier consumers are more likely to receive promotions with higher 
long-term rewards (Ru & Schoar, 2016). Complicated subprime mortgages, which 
offered low current payments but high deferred costs, were often sold to the least-
informed consumers (Bar-Gill, 2009; Bar-Gill, 2012). Gambling products have also 
increased in complexity in recent years; consumers can now gamble in more ways than 
ever before, and gamblers may also be misled by complexity. 
Here complexity is defined in relation to sports betting as the number of relevant 
possible outcomes that could happen in a specific class of events. For example, 
forecasting a soccer match’s end result is relatively “simple” as there are only three 
relevant outcomes (Team A wins, draw, Team B wins, called “three-outcome” gambles 
here). More “complex” tasks include forecasting the first goalscorer (at least 20 players 
could score the first goal), or the final match scoreline (an indefinite but large number, 
e.g., Team A wins 4-3). An economic consideration is that complex soccer gambles 
have higher bookmaker profit margins than simple gambles (Ayton, 1997; Dixon & 
Pope, 2004; Forrest & Simmons, 2001; Newall, 2015). The bookmaker profit margin 
can be calculated by summing the implied probabilities from quoted odds for a 
complete set of events (Kuypers, 2000). 1 The higher these odds sum to above 
probability = 1, the higher the bookmaker profit margin is. For example, a study of 
bookmaker odds over the 2014 soccer World Cup found average bookmaker profit 
margins of 4.6% for simple three-outcome gambles but much higher profit margins for 
more complex first goalscorer (32.3%) and scoreline (21.9%) gambles (Newall, 2015).  
Complexity also has psychological implications: complex probabilities are 
frequently overestimated, compared to simpler probabilities, across a range of domains 
(Fox, Rogers, & Tversky, 1996; Fox, 1999; Sonnemann, Camerer, Fox, & Langer, 
2013; Tversky & Koehler, 1994). For example, in the classic demonstration participants 
estimated a higher probability of “death resulting from heart disease, cancer or some 
other natural cause” than the logically-equivalent probability of “death from natural 
causes,” (Tversky & Koehler, 1994). Making complex sports predictions can also bias 
latter simple event predictions for the same sporting event (Kelly & Simmons, 2016).  
Soccer fans also struggle to estimate complex probabilities involving the joint 
estimation of multiple soccer matches, although these events do not feature frequently 
in British gambling advertising (Erceg & Galić, 2014; Nilsson & Andersson, 2010; 
                                                 
1 Where bookmaker profit margin = (sum of probabilities - 1)/sum of probabilities 
Teigen, Martinussen, & Lund, 1996). However, the previous findings in other domains 
would suggest that soccer fans may for example think that Team A has a higher 
probability of winning when that judgment is elicited by thinking about individual 
Team A winning scorelines and summing them, than compared to directly estimating 
Team A’s chances of winning. If confirmed, this would give a psychological reason for 
the economic pattern that complex soccer gambles are associated with high bookmaker 
profit margins, and suggest that consumers tend to overestimate the winning chances of 
complex soccer gambles. This would have implications for the regulation of gambling 
advertising, given the high frequency with which complex gambles occur in British 
soccer gambling advertising (Newall, 2015). 
The behavioral scientific approach taken here aims to complement other 
perspectives on gambling advertising (Binde, 2014). Problem gambling is increasingly 
viewed as a public health issue (Adams, 2008; Ferentzy & Turner, 2013; Grinols, 2004; 
Orford, 2010).  The critical social marketing perspective acknowledges that gambling 
firms’ marketing strategies are likely to be harmful to the end consumer (Moodie & 
Hastings, 2009). 
The current focus on soccer sports betting is complementary to findings in other 
gambling forms. Las Vegas-based electronic gaming machines exploit various decision-
making errors (Schüll, 2012). Lottery players are for example often categorized as 
irrational (Ariyabuddhiphongs, 2011), or as having a consumption value of playing 
(McCaffrey, 1994), and are motivated by wanting to improve their socioeconomic 
position (Haisley, Mostafa, & Loewenstein, 2008). 
Downstream negative consequences of gambling include increased risk of 
suicide (Black et al., 2015; Suissa, 2011). It has been suggests that gambling fills the 
void left by tobacco advertising in sports (Turco, 1999). But public attitudes towards 
sports gambling are rapidly shifting (Claussen & Miller, 2001). Gambling advertising 
increases public acceptance of gambling (Parke, Harris, Parke, Rigbye, & Blaszczynski, 
2015). Gambling advertising around sporting events helps to normalize gambling 
amongst children and adolescents (Hing, Vitartas, Lamont, & Fink, 2014), and 
gambling adverts prompt a large percentage of young people to gamble (J. Derevensky, 
Sklar, Gupta, & Messerlian, 2010). Youth gambling is arguably an important “hidden 
addiction” (J. L. Derevensky, Shek, & Merrick, 2011). Negative consequences of 
gambling are likely to be heightened if gambling advertising is systematically focused 
on gambles, with high average losses but which consumers incorrectly overestimate, as 
claimed here. 
Method 
A mixed methods design was used to combine observational data on gambling adverts 
that British soccer fans see, with experimental data on the rationality of soccer fans’ 
forecasts for commonly advertised gambles from the observational study. 
TV adverts observational study 
Live-odds gambling adverts were recorded during all televised English Premier League 
soccer matches over January and February 2016. While gambling adverts are shown 
during other sports and other soccer matches, the English Premier League is the most 
high-profile league of the UK’s favorite sport. Similar gambling adverts appear in other 
media, for example in newspapers, online, and in betting shop windows. Given the time 
required to collect, code, and analyze these data, TV adverts during English Premier 
League soccer matches were chosen as the highest-impact sub-sample of adverts. 
Adverts were then coded by gamble type, the odds of the specific gamble, and the 
bookmaker offering the gamble.  In total 63 gambles were recorded over 28 matches (M 
= 2.25 per-match), across five different bookmakers. Adverts were either shown before 
the start of the match, or during the half-time break. The Southampton versus West 
Ham match on February 8th was the only match without any live-odds adverts. 
Gambling odds data were downloaded from WilliamHill.com, one of the largest 
UK bookmakers. Since bookmakers tend to quote similar odds for soccer events 
(Newall, 2015), it was deemed that one bookmaker’s odds would serve as a sufficient 
proxy for all bookmakers’ odds. Full match data were later downloaded from 
whoscored.com (including the names of specific players taking part). These data were 
then used to estimate the bookmaker profit margin for various types of advertised 
gambles. 
Experiments 
In each experiment participants gave subjective probabilities for potential events in an 
upcoming real-life soccer match. Participants always estimated the three probabilities 
for the simplest three-outcome gambles, and probabilities for at least one more complex 
type of gamble. Estimates were given one at a time for each type of gamble, before 
moving onto a new type of gamble. Participants should ideally give a sum of subjective 
probabilities for a complete class of events equal to probability = 1. If judgments are on 
average overconfident, then the sum of subjective probabilities will exceed probability 
= 1. 
Participants. 
Participants for each experiment were recruited for a short online survey. Participants in 
Experiments 1-4 were recruited from the online crowdsourcing platforms Prolific 
Academic or Mechanical Turk (see Table 1). Online crowdsourcing platforms are 
becoming a popular alternative to undergraduate participant pools, as crowdsourcing 
platforms allow for large samples of demographically-diverse participants to be 
recruited easily and cost-effectively (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, 
Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). Research shows that these online participants are at least 
as attentive to task instructions as participants from traditional university-based pools 
(Hauser & Schwarz, 2016; Ramsey, Thompson, McKenzie, & Rosenbaum, 2016). 
Studies of the Mechanical Turk participant pool suggest that its participants are similar 
to the US population, if slightly younger on average (Huff & Tingley, 2015). Prolific 
Academic is a newer crowdsourcing platform than Mechanical Turk, and was used 
primarily for its ability to recruit UK-based participants (Mechanical Turk users are 
primarily from the US). 
These participants take part in academic experiments from their own homes in 
return for payment. Participants opt-into taking part with a study after seeing the 
baseline payment, estimated completion time, average completion time of past 
participants, and study content. Table 1 shows details of the baseline payments and 
average hourly payment rate for participants in Experiments 1-4. The average 
participant in the three Prolific Academic experiments received an average per-hour 
payment of between £7.50-£8.64. Participants in the Mechanical Turk experiment 
received an average per-hour payment of $2.70, a lower amount, but which is slightly 
above average for per-hour payment rates on Mechanical Turk (Ross, Irani, Silberman, 
Zaldivar, & Tomlinson, 2010). 
In Experiments 1-4 participants gave predictions about an upcoming real world 
soccer match involving their national team. Participants selected into the task after 
clicking a short descriptive link, e.g., “USA vs. Guatemala soccer match 30th March 
predictions.” However, there is the possibility that some participants may take part for 
the financial reward even if they have no interest in soccer. To help prevent against this, 
participants provided the number of soccer matches watched (either in-person or on 
television) during 2015. Participants responding “zero” were excluded from the analysis 
(see Table 1). In addition, a special group of dedicated soccer fans was recruited via 
social media for Experiment 5. Fans of the Premier League team Arsenal were recruited 
via postings on Arsenal-related Reddit pages and Twitter accounts. These participants 
were highly engaged with soccer, reporting watching an average of 74.5 soccer matches 
in 2015 (all reported a positive number for number of matches watched in 2015, 
suggesting that they were indeed soccer fans). 
The norm in economic experiments is to have some level of incentive-based pay, 
in addition to a baseline payment, to incentivize participants to think hard and engage 
with the task. Random lotteries of various sizes were used to incentivize truthful 
responses in Experiments 1-4, using an established procedure (Harrison, Martínez-
Correa, & Swarthout, 2014). The chance of winning the lottery depends on both 
participants’ answers and what actually happened in the match. With this procedure 
participants had a higher weighted chance of winning the lottery if events that they said 
were likely then actually occurred in the match. Because this procedure uses a 
complicated non-linear scoring rule to weight participants’ probability of winning a 
prize, participants were just (truthfully) told, “The likelihood of winning a prize 
depends on both your choices and what actually happens. Providing accurate 
predictions will maximize your chances of winning.” 
Materials. 
Participants gave subjective probabilities for events in an upcoming soccer match. It is 
important to elicit subjective probabilities in a way that participants can understand. As 
seen for example in Figure 1, live-odds gambling adverts tend to use fractional odds 
x/y, where x represents the potential profit from a successful bet of y units, 
corresponding to a probability of y/(x + y) (Cortis, 2015). However, many people are 
likely to find this method of stating probabilities unintuitive. 
An often-observed effect is that people perform better with probabilistic 
information when probabilities are reframed into natural frequencies involving whole 
numbers of events (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). For example, “2 out of 100” is easier 
for many people to incorporate in calculations than “probability = 0.02.” Subsequent 
work in a soccer estimation task suggests that soccer fans may find it easier to state 
subjective probabilities about upcoming soccer matches in natural frequencies (Erceg & 
Galić, 2014). All participants were presented instructions such as the following 
(depending on the event types they were estimating): 
Imagine that the match will be played 100 times. Your task is to predict how 
many times the match will end in a stated outcome. 
For example: 
"England to win" 
In how many of the 100 matches would England win the match? 
Please answer with a whole number between 0 and 100, where 0 means that the 
match will never end in that stated outcome, and 100 means the match will always end 
in that stated outcome. 
Procedure. 
Participants opted-into the survey by clicking a link on the participant pool website. 
Participants then read and agreed to a consent form before continuing to the online 
experiment. Participants gave subjective probabilities for one outcome at a time in a 
given event type by typing a number between zero and 100. Participants did this for 
each outcome in an event type (e.g., three estimates for a three-outcome gamble), before 
moving onto a new event type. Event type order was randomized. First goalscorer 
events used the predicted line-up on whoscored.com (since the experiment was 
performed before the date of the match, the exact line-ups were not known at the time of 
the experiment). At the end of the experiment participants were given a confirmation 
code which allowed them to claim payment for the survey from the participant pool 
website. Full experimental instructions as seen by participants and results can be 
downloaded from https://osf.io/68mzv/. 
Measures. 
The main dependent variable was the sum of probability judgments for a complete set 
of events (e.g., Team A wins, draw, Team B wins). Rational probability judgments are 
“coherent,” summing to probability = 1 for a complete set of events. “Incoherent” 
beliefs sum to greater than probability = 1, and can result in decision makers accepting 
guaranteed losing sequences of gambles (Seidenfeld, 1985). For example, if someone 
has probability beliefs summing to probability 1.5, while a bookmaker quotes odds for 
the same events summing to a total of 1.4, then the person will think at least one event 
is more likely than implied by the bookmaker’s price, and may well find that gamble 
attractive. The higher a person’s sum of probability judgments above probability = 1, 
the less rational they are as measured by this standard. 
At the end of each experiment, participants entered the number of live soccer 
matches (on TV or in person) that they watched in 2015. Participants responding “zero” 
were excluded from the following analysis. 
Results 
Table 2 shows results of the content analysis from the observational study (full details 
can be downloaded from https://osf.io/68mzv/). Each live-odds gambling advert was 
broken down into specific types of gambles that can be made on a soccer match. Three-
outcome gambles were advertised 17.5% of the time, and were always advertised as a 
“new customer enhanced price” – offering unusually high potential wins for these 
gambles as a potential reward to new customers only. All other advertised gambles were 
more complex. The third column in Table 2 shows the “mean decimal odds” for each 
gamble type. The decimal odds represent the total win from a successful bet of $1/£1. 
As can be seen, complex gambles offer high potential wins, and are potentially alluring 
to gamblers who are attracted by the maximum potential win (Golec & Tamarkin, 
1998). 
The majority of advertised gambles involved a player scoring a goal (58.7%), 
which involves a number of complex comparisons given the 20 outfield players taking 
part in a soccer match. Usually the advertised gamble was on the identity of the 
first/next goalscorer (39.7%). The other cases involved complex combinations of 
events, such as a player scoring and their team winning (12.7%), or a gamble on two 
specific players each scoring (3.2%). Other advertised gambles were on the correct 
scoreline (6.3%), or on a team to win and both teams to score (17.5%, otherwise known 
as a “six-outcome” gamble, as teams either will or won’t both score). Other than the 
17.5% of three-outcome gambles, the remaining advertised gambles involved complex 
events. These results are similar to a past observational study of gambling advertising 
during the 2014 World Cup (Newall, 2015). Panel a in Figure 1 shows screenshots of 
examples of commonly advertised gambles.  
Were the odds on advertised complex gambles fair? There were 37 adverts 
involving a player scoring a goal. Gambling odds data downloaded from 
WilliamHill.com and player information from whoscored.com can be used to give a 
rough estimate for these adverts. In total 20 outfield players start each match, either one 
of these players will score the first goal or no goal will be scored. These 21 probabilities 
should add up to probability = 1 if the odds are fair (in fact, less than one given that a 
substitute player may score the first goal). Actually, the probabilities added up to an 
average of 1.529, resulting in a bookmaker profit margin of 34.6%. By contrast, odds 
for three-outcome gambles for these games added up to an average of 1.060, resulting in 
a much lower bookmaker profit margin of 5.7%. The cost of complexity was not limited 
to first goalscorer gambles: odds on the four advertised scoreline gambles added to an 
average of 1.301, or a bookmaker profit margin of 23.2%. While this is only a small 
sample, the previous literature repeatedly also finds that gamble complexity and 
bookmaker profit margins are positively correlated (Ayton, 1997; Dixon & Pope, 2004; 
Forrest & Simmons, 2001; Newall, 2015). 
Panel b of Figure 1 shows the experimental results. Results were remarkably 
consistent across all participant groups, suggesting that differences in participant 
payment and recruitment did not affect the experimental results. Panel b shows that 
three-outcome gambles were estimated the closest to probability = 1 across all 
experiments (or equivalently as 100 percent as these judgments were actually elicited 
from participants). Mean three-outcome estimates ranged in a narrow band from 103.3 
percent (Experiment 1) to 111.6 percent (Experiment 4). This demonstrates that average 
responses were not overconfident when the event being asked about was sufficiently 
simple (across all participant groups). The other more complex gambles were estimated 
less accurately. Six-outcome gambles (17.5% of advertised gambles) break each event 
in a three-outcome gamble into two possibilities: Either both teams score (see e.g., top-
right of Panel a, “Liverpool to win and both teams to score”), or at least one team fails 
to score. Even this relatively minor doubling of possible outcomes led to large increases 
in summed probability judgments in Experiments 3 (M = 150.7)) and 4 (M = 166.7) 
(Panel b). 
Scoreline gambles, e.g., Team A to win 1-0, 2-0, 2-1 etc., are sub-cases of the 
three-outcome gamble “Team A to win.” (6.3% of advertised gambles, see bottom-right 
of Panel a).  The large number of potential scorelines leads to additional complexity 
compared to three-outcome gambles. Probabilities were elicited for the 16 most likely 
scorelines (every scoreline from 0-0 to 3-3). Scoreline judgments summed to an average 
of 279.0 percent (Experiment 2) and 306.4 percent (Experiment 4). 
The remaining 58.7% of advertised gambles involved specific players scoring a 
goal (see bottom-left of Panel a). These gambles are complex. There are for example 20 
outfield players who could score the first goal (plus the probability that nobody scores). 
Participants in Experiment 1 gave mean responses for these 21 probabilities of 248.8 
percent. These were the same participants who nonetheless provided highly accurate 
three-outcome forecasts. Participants in Experiments 1-4 were recruited from online 
crowdsourcing websites. It could be that dedicated fans will give more accurate 
responses. Fans of the English Premier League team Arsenal were recruited from social 
media for Experiment 5. These fans estimated the probability of the 10 Arsenal players 
scoring the first goal and the probability of no-goal. Their responses summed to an 
average of 124.5 percent, before even considering the possibility of the rival team 
scoring (they only estimated 11 of 21 possible events to minimize the burden of this 
unpaid survey; eliciting preferences over the full 21 events may well have produced 
very similar results to those found in Experiment 1). Their first goalscorer estimates 
were significant higher than their three-outcome estimates (t(212) = -3.27, p = .001). 
Discussion 
This paper illustrates economic and psychological (and hence behavioral scientific) 
factors relevant to British gambling advertising. A content analysis of high-impact 
televised soccer adverts showed that most advertised gambles were for complex events. 
Gamble complexity is economically-relevant, given the high bookmaker profit margins 
for complex events shown here and elsewhere. The series of five experiments in this 
paper then demonstrated the psychological relevance of gamble complexity, showing 
the over-optimistic probabilistic expectations surrounding complex events, conceptually 
replicating experimental evidence in other domains. These complimentary streams of 
economic and psychological evidence suggest that consumers require additional help to 
accurately understand the complex events involved in British gambling advertising. 
Future research should aim to address the limitations of the data presented in this 
paper. The content analysis was performed over a relatively small number of adverts. 
While the types of advertised gambles closely followed a previous study of bookmaker 
window and TV adverts (Newall, 2015), the prevalence of similar gambling advertising 
over a wide variety of media suggest the scope for a wider follow-up study (e.g., across 
betting shop windows, newspapers, online banner adverts and social media, and SMS 
text messaging). Research should also investigate similar gambling advertising across 
other sports and in other countries (Hing, Sproston, Brook, & Brading, 2016). 
Future research should also address any potential limitations in this paper’s 
experimental evidence. While event complexity led to increasingly over-optimistic 
beliefs across both general population and soccer fan samples, this may possibly be an 
artefact of the experimental situation. It is possible that behavior will differ when 
participants must risk their own money with each prediction, as when gambling. It could 
also be the case that experienced gamblers display different behaviour than non-
experienced gamblers. Research in other domains does show, however, that complex 
probabilities are overestimated compared to simple probabilities even in highly 
incentivized and repeated laboratory and real world tasks (Sonnemann et al., 2013). 
This evidence is relevant to gambling advertising regulatory policy. Consumers’ 
inability to accurately understand complex events suggests that these adverts should at a 
minimum be combined with some sort of disclosure highlighting the long-run risks of 
advertised gambles. Prominently disclosing the relevant bookmaker profit margin 
alongside any advertising should help consumers to appreciate the long-run risks of 
advertised gambles. While there has been a large public response to the risks of 
gambling on “fixed odds betting terminals (FOBTs)” (Bridge, 2016), many consumers 
may be unaware that the maximum bookmaker profit margin of 3% on FOBTs (Europe 
Economics, 2005) is much lower than bookmaker profit margins on complex soccer 
gambles. 
Disclosing bookmaker profit margins is similar to recommendations for helping 
consumers navigate complexity in other consumer markets (Bar-Gill, 2012). If 
successful, this strategy may help consumers to either avoid or be more price-sensitive 
with costly complex gambles. This is similar to calorie information disclosure for food, 
or alcohol content disclosure, which aim to alert consumers to relevant risks across 
different products. However, any education campaign around the risks of gambling 
products must be aware of research highlighting the fundamental difficulties much of 
the population faces with evaluating statistical risks and processing numerical 
information (Gigerenzer, 2002; Kahneman, 2011). Disclosure of relevant bookmaker 
profit margins would be a welcome addition to recent industry-led changes around 
gambling advertising (Senet Group, 2014). 
As of August 2016 Britain’s highest-circulation newspaper, The Sun, has opened 
its own bookmaker, “The Sun Bets.” This new bookmaker is being actively cross-
promoted in The Sun. Importantly, this bookmaker does not just offer bets on sporting 
events, but on a range of events likely to appeal to a much wider part of the population. 
For example, on the 31st of August and 1st of September 2016, The Sun newspaper ran 
features discussing the betting odds of the next actor to play James Bond and the next 
winner of the BBC’s Strictly Come Dancing (a full double page spread in the latter 
case). Quoted odds implied a bookmaker profit margin of 10.4% for James Bond (6 
potential events) and a profit margin of 20.3% for Strictly Come Dancing (15 potential 
events). This again helps to illustrate the link between the bookmaker profit margin and 
event complexity. Few consumers are likely to appreciate these differential risks, and 
hence disclosures should accompany this form of gambling advertising. It is not just 
sports-watching consumers who are now exposed to this form of gambling advertising. 
Conclusions 
The easy availability of gambling and the prominence of gambling advertising have led 
to an active public debate in Britain (Bridge, 2016; Sylvester, 2014). Numerous public 
health consequences of gambling are possibly worsened when gamblers are losing more 
money than they can afford (Adams, 2008; Ferentzy & Turner, 2013; Grinols, 2004; 
Orford, 2010).  The costs of gambling are high, with the most recent figures indicating 
average losses of £310 per adult per year (Ellson, 2016). This research highlights how a 
relevant psychological factor, event complexity, may lead to consumers underestimating 
the costs of complex gambles with high bookmaker profit margins. Only educated and 
informed consumers, who fully understand the relevant risks of different gambling 
products, can gamble responsibly. 
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Table 1. Overview of experiments. 
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Note. Bonuses in Experiment 4 were assigned randomly due to a programming error. 
No bonus was offered in Experiment 5 to maintain participant anonymity. Participants 




Table 2. Observational data on advertised live-odds adverts. The mean decimal odds 
represent the average potential win from a successful gamble of £1/$1 (e.g., decimal 
odds of 12.0 represent a total payout of $12). 
 
Gamble type Number of adverts 
 
Mean decimal odds 
Three-outcome gamble, new player bonus 11 (17.5%) 8.5 
Correct scoreline 4 (6.3%) 12.0 
Team A to win and both teams to score (six-
outcome gamble) 
11 (17.5%) 5.2 
Player A to score first/next 25 (39.7%) 8.2 
Player A to score and Team A to win 8 (12.7%) 5.1 
Player A to score and Player B to score 2 (3.2%) 8.3 
Player A to score a goal 1 (1.6%) 6 
Player A to score two or more goals 1 (1.6%) 4.5 




a         
b 
 
Figure 1. TV advert examples (Panel a) and experimental results (Panel b). Odds of 6/1 
mean a winning gamble earns 6 units profit for every 1 unit wagered. Panel a shows 
examples (clockwise from top-left) of three-outcome, six-outcome, scoreline, and first 
goalscorer gambles. Error bars are 95% CIs. There is a clear trend where event 















judgment sum. First goalscorer estimates in Experiment 5 were elicited over only 11 out 
of 21 potential events. 
